This week I focused on Clay Spinuzzi’s book, Tracing Genres, when adding nodes to my mindmap. For this round, I added four new nodes with connections out from three of them. The node I left relatively unconnected for now contained definitions for the three levels of analysis that Spinuzzi sets up: macroscopic, mesoscopic, and microscopic. The reason I left it unconnected here is that I want to create a separate Popplet that has major nodes with each of those levels and connections to examples and quotes that embody each level. I thought about doing that connection here, but my mindmap is getting more than a little complex.
One of the first quotes I chose is in regards what genes are and, in a way, what they are not: “Genres are not simply text types; they are culturally and historically grounded ways of ‘seeing and conceptualizing reality’… Genres are not discrete artifacts, but traditions of producing, using, and interpreting artifacts, traditions that make their way into the artifact as a ‘form-shaping ideology'” (Spinuzzi 41). This quote reminded me a lot of Bitzer’s consideration of rhetoric as a “mode of altering reality…by the creation of discourse which changes reality through the mediation of thought and action” (3). I thought this was really interesting because I had never really thought of genres as “culturally and historically grounded” and, when I did, it was only in passing and only as related to the Greeks with their apologies. It makes sense that as cultures change, rhetoric will take on different forms that are reshaped around people’s needs. It seems like genres are a way for us to impose order on the chaos of discourse, a way for us to see reality within boundaries or to define what we see as reality. Again, I am reminded of the medical forms analyzed by Popham. Those forms are not necessary to human survival in any way, but we give them meaning by imposing societal value on them; they become a discourse between us, our doctors, our insurance companies, and any others who are part of the process. As we are filling out the forms, we define ourselves as patients and allow others to see us as the same as well as bits of data. The political discourse around elections also seems to be its own kind of genre. As candidates go for whatever position, they and their supporters produce commercials, pamphlets, signs, and advertisements as a to define themselves as a political and public figure, reshaping themselves to fit images they believe would be most beneficial in gaining votes. Ballots also function as artifacts in the political genre and, when we vote, we are defining ourselves as voters and as citizens, but also allow us to see us as statistics (part of a majority or a minority), supporters or opponents, and so on. We don’t need politicians and politics for our basic survival, but we agree, more or less as a collective, that society would not function without such frameworks in place.
Um, haha, now that my tangent is over. The second quote I chose is one of my favorites: “Mirel argues that no matter how fine the grain, ‘knowing and learning take place in a dynamic system of people, practices, artifacts, communities, and institutional structures,’ and that such dynamic systems always coconstitute even the finest grain of human activity” (Spinuzzi 29). I like this because knowledge is communal and continual. Human activity is what creates history, literature, mathematics, music, visual arts, and other subjects, and then that knowledge moves forward (and sometimes gets left behind) to be presented to younger generations who will imitate, react against, or build upon with other activities. I liked this quote with two quotes by Vatz — “To the audience, events become meaningful only through their linguistic depiction” (157) and “If…you view meaning as a consequence of rhetorical creation, your paramount concern will be how and by whom symbols create the reality to which people react” (158). I chose these two quotes because the idea of symbols and linguistic depictions are learned and emerge out of the collective knowledge. Meaning for us with events and rhetoric comes out of what we know and can identify. Hmm that sounded to abstract. What I mean is that I can recognize the meaning of something or learn the meaning of something by identifying it based on what I already know. For example, with the politicians I mentioned in the paragraph above. I can recognize and make meaning from their rhetorical choices because I know enough about the political system of the U.S. for their promises, their accusations against other candidates or the current system, and their proposals to make sense. These politicians and my understanding of them do not exist in a vacuum.
For the last quote I connected outwards, I chose two and combined them in a single node: “We can talk about genres mingling, merging, splitting, disintegrating, and being repurposed. Genre provides a way of lending dimension to the genetic aspects of given artifacts–to make connections among discrete artifacts that, on the surface, may bear little resemblance to each other” and “The genre embodies a galaxy of assumptions, strategies, and ideological orientations that the individual speaker may not recognize. It represents others’ ‘thinking out’ of problems whose dialogue has been preserved in genre” (Spinuzzi 42 and 43). I linked these two quotes to ones from Bitzer, Vatz, and Foucault, though I need to go back and link it to Popham as well. I could discuss why I chose Bitzer and Vatz, but I am instead going to use this space to talk about the quote I linked it to from Foucault, his enunciative level of formation in relation to the statement and the sentence. I’m paying more attention to this particular link because I am not sure if the connection is correct and wanted to unpack my own thinking. Foucault describes statements as “linked rather to a ‘referential’ that is made up…of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects that are named, designated, or described within it, and for the relations that are affirmed or denied in it. The referential of the statement forms the place, the condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between individuals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into play by the statement itself; it defines the possibilities of appearance and delimitation of that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value of truth to the proposition” (91). I feel like these statements are what composes “others’ ‘thinking out'” in the genre galaxy that Spinuzzi mentions and is that genres lend dimension to as they mingle and merge and split and disintegrate and even as they are repurposed. When a person constructs a statement, they may not recognize the possibilities, rules, and relations that are embedded within the referential of the statement, and this same thing seems to happen when a person puts forth a text (like a novel) and cannot completely see all of the different genre types that may be associated with his/her work.
To Soothe One’s Mind, Add a Violin: